



# OT Cybersecurity

The 2023 Year In Review

LESSONS LEARNED FROM  
FRONTLINE DEFENDERS

Marissa Costa  
Jackson Evans-Davies  
Hussain Virani  
Eddy Wade

# Agenda

- 1 Introductions
- 2 ICS Incident Response Plan
- 3 Defensible Architecture
- 4 ICS Network Visibility & Monitoring
- 5 Secure Remote Access
- 6 Risk-based Vulnerability Management
- 7 Case Studies from the Frontlines

SANS

5

THE FIVE  
ICS CYBER  
SECURITY  
CRITICAL  
CONTROLS

# Meet Our Experts



**Jackson Evans-  
Davies**  
Director of  
Professional Services



**Hussain  
Virani**  
Senior Industrial  
Incident Responder



**Eddy  
Wade**  
Principal Industrial  
Consultant



**Marissa  
Costa**  
Senior Industrial  
Penetration Tester

# Five ICS Cyber Security Critical Controls

SANS

5

THE FIVE  
ICS CYBER  
SECURITY  
CRITICAL  
CONTROLS

01

ICS Incident Response Plan

Reports with findings

38%

02

Defensible Architecture

46%

03

ICS Network Visibility & Monitoring

61%

04

Secure Remote Access

29%

05

Risk-based Vulnerability Management



41%

# Incident Response (IR) Readiness

## INDUSTRY-WIDE SHIFT TOWARD TABLETOP EXERCISE ENGAGEMENTS

### Tabletop Exercises

- Best way to test & refine IR plan
- Demonstrate how a realistic attack may occur in your OT environment




CORE CAPABILITES FOR INCIDENT  
RESPONSE READINESS


# Ransomware Attacks Increased by 50%

LAST YEAR, THERE WERE 905 RANSOMWARE ATTACKS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

## RANSOMWARE BY ICS SECTOR




**RANSOMWARE SPREADS IN FLAT NETWORKS**  
28% of customer engagements had findings of segmentation issues or improperly configured firewalls



# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements

## NETWORK SEGMENTATION



28% of Engagements in 2023 Identified Issues with Network Segmentation.

Notable Industries:  
Mfg. (58% Engagements),  
Transportation (36%)


### EXAMPLES INCLUDE:

- Lack of an OT DMZ
- Domain Authentication Spanning Zones
- Unsecured External Connectivity
- External DNS Resolvers
- Safety System Segmentation
- Unsafe Historian Architecture

# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements


## EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS TO OT ENVIRONMENTS

An External Connection is Any Internet Protocol (IP) and/or Asset That Communicated Beyond a Pre-defined Security Perimeter



Dragos issued findings related to external connections in **20%** of assessment reports in **2023**

Dragos identified firewall weaknesses in **28%** of assessment reports in **2023**





# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements

## LIMITED OR NO ASSET VISIBILITY

61% of Service Engagements in 2023 had Findings Related to Network or Asset Visibility



89%

Manufacturing

46%

Oil & Gas

63%


Electric Sector

# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements

## SECURE REMOTE ACCESS

### Common SRA Findings:

- Lack of Multi-Factor Authentication
- Insecure Remote Access Configuration
- Remote Service Session Hijacking Vulnerabilities
- Insecure/Unrestricted File Transfer
- Unmonitored Permanent Vendor Connections



# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements

## RISK-BASED VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT

Almost half (41%) of Dragos 2023 assessment reports included vulnerability related findings.

### Key Examples:

- No Vulnerability Mgmt. Program
- Unpatched Perimeter Devices (e.g. Firewalls)
- Industrial Control System Vulnerabilities
- Various *years old* vulnerabilities indicating a lack of maintenance
- Vulnerabilities exploited in penetration tests such as Windows *PrintNightmare*

3%

of ICS/OT Vulnerabilities Needed to be Addressed **NOW**

68%


Need to be Addressed **NEXT**

29%

Likely **NEVER** Need to be Addressed

# Lessons Learned From Customer Engagements

## OVERALL REPORT SEVERITY BY INDUSTRY



# Voltzite



## VOLTZITE EXFILTRATION COULD FACILITATE FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS WITH PHYSICAL IMPACTS



Heavy use of living off the land (LOTL) techniques. Evades detection with slow, steady reconnaissance.

### TARGETS:

Electric Power Generation, Transmission & Distribution, Emergency Services, Telecommunications, Defense Industrial Bases, Satellite Services

### INTENT/MOTIVATION:

Espionage & exfiltration, long-term persistent access.

## KILLCHAIN ANALYSIS

Delivery

STAGE  
01

Exploit

STAGE  
01

Install/Modify

STAGE  
01

C2

STAGE  
01

Act

STAGE  
01

## CAPABILITIES

Exploits internet accessible SOHO routers, uses them as intermediary hops back to ORB

Native Windows command line and PowerShell, Active Directory tools

Use of built-in proxy commands, open-source tools, & fast reverse proxy tool (frp)

Initial access by exploiting edge network devices from Cisco, Ivanti, PRTG Network Monitor, Fortinet amongst others

Stages and exfiltrates sensitive operational data related to OT networks and processes

Overlaps with Volt Typhoon (Microsoft), BRONZE SILHOUETTE (Secureworks), Vanguard Panda (CrowdStrike), UNC3236 (Mandiant)

# Living Off the Land (LOTL) Attacks

## THREAT GROUPS USING LOTL TECHNIQUES




Fileless Attacks Using Tools Native to Victim Environments


Evade Detection

Persist Longer

## RANSOMWARE GROUPS USE LOTL TECHNIQUES TO ESCALATE PRIVILEGES, GAIN PERSISTENCE, & ESTABLISH C2 CHANNELS



# Living Off the Land (LOTL) Techniques



RESULTS FROM DRAGOS  
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES  
PENETRATION TESTING



# Network Penetration Test – LOTL Case Study



## IT to OT Perimeter Assessment

1. Collected IT Domain Hashes from previous Pentest ([dump.txt](#))
2. Privilege Escalation & Persistence using NetExec
3. RDP Session Hijacking ([tscon.exe](#) & [shadow](#) support)



## OT Assessment

1. Gain Persistence using Hijacked Access
2. Disable Workstation AV
3. Collect Local Hashes via [Taskmgr.exe](#) ([lsass.dmp](#))
4. Upload [Mimikatz.exe](#) and [Psexec.exe](#) over RDP
5. Pass-the-Hash using [Mimikatz.exe](#) and [Psexec.exe](#)
  - a) Lateral Movement (same network) via [SMB](#)
  - b) Pivot (new networks and security zones) via [SMB](#)



# Recommendations

SANS



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CRITICAL  
CONTROLS

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ICS Incident Response Plan

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02

Defensible Architecture

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03

ICS Network Visibility & Monitoring

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04

Secure Remote Access

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05

Risk-based Vulnerability Management

# Q&A

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS



# ENHANCE YOUR OT THREAT PREPAREDNESS.

Download the Report:  
[dragos.com/year-in-review](https://dragos.com/year-in-review)