DRAGOS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OT CYBERSECURITY

THE 2023 YEAR IN REVIEW

FEBRUARY 2024

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Executive Summary

Several forces drove a surge of activity from adversaries targeting operational technology (OT) infrastructure in 2023, marking a pivotal shift in the cyber threat landscape. Motivated by mounting geopolitical tensions, sophisticated threat groups and hacktivists demonstrated the capacity to breach the networks of critical infrastructure and, in some cases, disrupt OT systems. With each passing year, the number of ransomware incidents globally climbs even higher, leading to cascading impacts for virtually every industrial sector, particularly manufacturing. Meanwhile, the number of vulnerabilities present in industrial control systems (ICS) environments continue to grow exponentially, along with the adversaries' appetite to exploit them.

Based on customer engagements across various industries within the past year, we saw that electric, oil and gas, water and manufacturing sectors made moderate improvements in their OT cybersecurity posture on average, but many industrial organizations still struggle with passwords and still more are unable to detect threats to their OT environment. It's time to take bigger strides. Addressing this challenge requires coordinated efforts from partners across the OT cybersecurity community and, when necessary, emergency measures to mitigate adverse effects on critical business operations and the communities they serve.

Read on to get a summary view of the significant trends in the OT cybersecurity community from 2023. We offer up-to-date data on current threat groups, new and old, actively targeting industrial organizations. We highlight our ransomware and vulnerability findings, noting the industries and devices at increasing risk. And, we offer frontline insights with actionable guidance to help you effectively defend against and respond to industrial cyber threats. We conclude with an overview of the five critical controls for ICS/OT cybersecurity to help you understand how to get started on your OT cyber journey.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS: BY THE NUMBERS

Threat Group Highlights – 2023



21 Total Threat Groups

10 Active Threat Groups

3 New Threat Groups

Key Vulnerabilities Findings

80%

of vulnerabilities **reside deep within the ICS network.**

16%

of advisories were **network exploitable and perimeter facing** in 2023.

53%

of the advisories that Dragos analyzed **could cause both a loss of view and loss of control,** up from 51% last year.

31%

of advisories **contained errors** in 2023.

49%

Dragos provided mitigations for 49% of the advisories that had none.

Key Ransomware Findings

↑ 50%

Ransomware attacks against industrial organizations **increased 50 percent** over last year.

28%

Dragos tracked **28% more ransomware groups** impacting ICS/OT in 2023.

70%

of all ransomware attacks targeted **638 manufacturing entities** in **33 unique manufacturing subsectors**.

2023 Dragos Threat Groups Summary

Three new threat groups: **GANANITE, LAURIONITE** and **VOLTZITE**

10 active threat groups: **BENTONITE, ELECTRUM, GANANITE, KAMACITE, LAURIONITE, MAGNALLIUM, PETROVITE, RASPITE, TALONITE** and **VOLTZITE**

ELECTRUM demonstrates Stage 1 & 2 aspects of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain



9 threat groups demonstrate at least Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain: **BENTONITE, ELECTRUM, GANANITE, KAMACITE, LAURIONITE, MAGNALLIUM, PETROVITE, RASPITE,** and **VOLTZITE**



2 threat groups, **ERYTHRITE** and **COVELLITE**, were retired in 2023. **11 threat groups** were dormant

Threat Group Statistics from 2022 Year in Review:



2 new threat groups: **BENTONITE** and **CHERNOVITE**

8 active threat groups: **BENTONITE, CHERNOVITE, ELECTRUM, ERYTHRITE, KAMACITE, KOSTOVITE, WASSONITE** and **XENOTIME**

Notable OT Cybersecurity Trends in 2023

Reaching a Tipping Point for OT Facilities

More than ever, factories, power plants, and pipelines share common devices, software packages, network protocols, and facility designs; industrial facilities have moved towards more homogenous infrastructure. They have also been connected to other networks and to the internet. These two developments bring advantages to industries, but it means adversaries can exploit ICS/OT systems remotely and attack capabilities can be repurposed. This past year, the U.S. government learned of vulnerabilities present in a subset of Rockwell Automation ControlLogix communication modules. These devices, used across various industrial sectors, might have been compromised if not for the advance collaboration between government agencies, Rockwell, and security vendors, including Dragos, to search for evidence of exploitation and develop detections. This example helps illustrate the great challenges facing the ICS/OT community and how we can work together to enable a unified, risk-based response.

Geopolitical Agendas Motivated OT Threat Groups

Executing cyber attacks in ICS/OT environments has long been the domain of sophisticated and skilled adversaries, and 2023 was no different. The Ukraine-Russia war continued to serve as the backdrop for more aggressive cyber operations throughout 2023. Mounting tensions between China and Taiwan also led to targeted cyber espionage across several industrial organizations in the Asia-Pacific region and North America. The relationship between geopolitics and cyber threats to ICS/OT is well-established. As global adversaries expand their reach and improve their attack capabilities, industrial organizations will want to maintain situational awareness to understand the potential risks to their business operations.

Determined Hacktivists Disrupted Peace of Mind, Then OT Systems

Less sophisticated hacktivists, motivated by the same geopolitical events, conducted widespread operations in 2023. Hacktivist groups spread false or exaggerated claims of successful cyber attacks on critical ICS/OT infrastructure throughout the year, leading to fears and uncertainty about the resilience of regional critical services. After consistent promotion of misleading claims targeting companies in the Middle East, one such hacktivist group, the self-styled CyberAv3ngers, broadened their operations and stepped up their objectives late in the year with attacks on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used by water utilities across North America and Europe with an anti-Israel message. These events represented the first time a hacktivist group was able to achieve Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain and demonstrated that it is possible to disrupt ICS/OT using unsophisticated methods with weak or non-existent security controls.

Industrial Ransomware Attacks Caused Broad Impact

Ransomware attacks on industrial organizations increased by nearly 50 percent in 2023, affecting virtually all sectors, but with an overwhelming 71 percent of ransomware attacks directed at manufacturers. Ransomware groups do not explicitly target ICS/OT, but risks are introduced by precautionary operations shutdowns to limit the impact of an attack, flattened industrial networks, and the integration of ICS kill processes into ransomware strains. Several incidents last year highlighted the possibility of cascading effects and impacts of ransomware on manufacturers, supply chains, and consumers. Dole and Yanfeng International Automotive Technology are key examples. Financial reports released by those manufacturers directly or indirectly impacted by ransomware attacks demonstrate the high costs from recovery and lost revenue when business operations are halted.

Too Many Vulnerabilities, Not Enough Guidance for OT

Of the 531 advisories impacting industrial environments disclosed last year, Dragos provided updated mitigation for 49 percent of the advisories that had missing mitigation advice. The inadequacies of CVSS and the lack of mitigations tailored to operational technology environments accompanying vulnerabilities complicates an already burdensome undertaking. Patching is not always possible, or even necessary. Time wasted patching vulnerabilities that only require monitoring might mean a more critical vulnerability gets overlooked. One positive sign is the increase in the number of vulnerabilities that require user authentication to exploit. This is a good thing for defenders, but having a password is not enough to label a device secure. There are many ways for adversaries to obtain credentials as well as escalate their privileges. Industrial environments need vulnerability prioritization metrics tailored to OT and vulnerabilities should be addressed in context of operational factors and the specific configurations in place.

Key Steps Still Needed to Secure OT

Despite hopeful changes resulting in stronger cybersecurity posture within many industrial sectors, there is still a long way to go. Industrial organizations with network segmentation issues and improperly configured firewalls left the door open for adversaries that act to compromise OT systems by way of IT networks. Dragos observed in 2023 that 70 percent of OT-related incidents originated from within the IT environment, which is a staggering figure. Another major challenge to tackle in the coming year is improving the ability to detect threats in ICS environments, particularly in oil and gas and manufacturing. This can be improved with more robust asset monitoring and intelligence-based detections. Detecting threats only a percentage of the time, or with great difficulty, falls short in the current OT threat landscape.

2023 OT Threat Landscape

The OT cyber threat landscape continued to evolve in 2023, with an increase in tracked threat groups, ransomware events, and other cyber operations driven by global conflict. The adversaries involved in these activities varied widely in terms of their level of sophistication, deployed capabilities, and intended targets. On one end of the spectrum, some threat groups used advanced techniques, such as leveraging native functionality, including living off the land (LOTL) techniques, to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence operations. Conversely, some adversaries focused on soft targets such as internet-accessible devices that lacked proper hardening, thus making them easy to damage and cause operational disruptions.

In 2023, Dragos tracked 21 threat groups focused on OT targets following the addition of three newly defined groups – VOLTZITE, GANANITE, LAURIONITE – and the retirement of two threat groups, ERYTHRITE and COVELLITE.

The number of known threat groups targeting ICS/OT has grown significantly since the first publication of the OT Cybersecurity Year in Review in 2017. Even as some groups retire and go dormant, new groups step in to fill those ranks. Dragos Intelligence tracks threat groups that attempt to gain access to OT systems and those with the potential to facilitate such attacks in the future. Cyber adversaries often do extensive research and development to build their programs and campaigns over time, and several Dragos-tracked threat groups show signs of evolving their disruptive and destructive capabilities.

New Dragos Threat Groups

VOLTZITE

VOLTZITE, which overlaps with Volt Typhoon (Microsoft), was first observed performing reconnaissance and enumeration of multiple electric companies based in the United States. Since then, **VOLTZITE** has been observed targeting cybersecurity research, technology, defense industrial bases, banking, satellite services, telecommunications, and educational organizations. They have traditionally targeted US-based facilities, but have since expanded their targeting to include organizations in Africa and Southeast Asia. This group heavily uses living off the land (LOTL) techniques, which can make detection and response efforts more difficult. This strategy, paired with slow and steady reconnaissance, enables **VOLTZITE** to avoid detection from security teams.

The threat group's behavior in 2023 suggests their current goal is espionage, information gathering, and persistent access. **VOLTZITE's** proximity to the utility's OT network in observed cases and subsequent SMB traversal maneuvers demonstrated attempts to penetrate the OT network, aiming to access OT data with a focus on SCADA-related information. It is important to note that data stolen from operational technology networks may result in unintended disruption to critical industrial processes or provide the adversary with crucial intelligence to aid in follow-up offensive tool development or attacks against OT.

Vz

TARGETS: ASIA, AFRICA, UNITED STATES



NOTABLE ACTIVITY



June 2023 — Compromise of network and video surveillance through Sierra Wireless Airlink

July 2023 — Exploitation attempts against African electric entity

November 2023 — Enumeration of U.S. energy organizations

- VOLTZITE exploited public internet-facing Sierra Wireless Airlink devices of a U.S. emergency management and traffic monitoring entity in a June 2023 campaign.
- Possible exploitation attempts in July 2023 against an African electric transmission, distribution, and retailer entity.
- VOLTZITE conducted extensive reconnaissance of U.S. energy organizations in November 2023.

This case study breaks down a VOLTZITE persistent threat hunt executed by Dragos OT Watch utilizing the Platform, Threat Intelligence and Neighborhood Keeper at a U.S. based electric utility.

OT Watch Threat Hunting Uncovers VOLTZITE

- The Dragos Intelligence team started tracking **VOLTZITE's** activities at the beginning of 2023.
- A new utility customer deployed the Dragos Platform in response to a pre-existing network compromise with a potential ICS/OT impact. The platform was positioned to monitor the IT-OT interface (Level 3-4) and OT-OT communications (Level 2).
- Following deployment, Dragos OT Watch utilized the Dragos Platform to identify malicious activity within the environment working with Dragos Intelligence using tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and threat hunt analytics.
- The threat hunt confirmed adversary evidence adjacent to the OT network; and incident response analysis found evidence of adversary discovery actions with a focus on SCADA related information. This was seen in the Dragos Platform as server message block (SMB) traversal with the group pivoting within the environment, and likely, looking for information about the environment as a further means of persistence.
- Consistent with OT Watch operations, findings were promptly escalated to the customer with a full summary of all threat hunt findings after the full investigation. The recommendations further empowered the customer's incident response efforts in cleaning up the incident to eliminate the adversary from the environment. The environment continues to be monitored via the Dragos Platform and OT Watch.
- Taking the success of the threat hunt and the detailed understanding on the tactics of this threat group provided by the Dragos Intelligence team, OT Watch extended the hunt across all relevant OT Watch customers.
- The Dragos Intelligence team enhanced the effort by analyzing Neighborhood Keeper data for indications of **VOLTZITE** behaviors and then notifying impacted parties anonymously. With these findings, Dragos threat detections engineers developed high-fidelity detections back into the Platform deployed via Dragos Knowledge Packs for continuous monitoring.

The overall response to the **VOLTZITE** threat highlights the importance of coordinated efforts and the advantage of ICS/OT capabilities unique to Dragos. This engagement not only addressed a complex threat but also strengthened the protective measures across critical infrastructure customers.

GANANITE

GANANITE targets critical infrastructure and government entities in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Asian nations. **GANANITE** focuses on espionage and data theft, with the possibility of handing off initial access to other threat groups. This group is focused on its target sets by employing many known tools and techniques to infiltrate its victims. **GANANITE** has been observed conducting multiple attacks against key personnel related to ICS operations management in a prominent European oil and gas company, rail organizations in Turkey and Azerbaijan, multiple transportation and logistics companies, an automotive machinery company, and at least one European government entity overseeing public water utilities.

Although **GANANITE** has not yet shown evidence of moving into OT networks or an elevated capability resembling Stage 2 actions of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain, their assessed capabilities show efficient use of multiple phases across Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain.

Gn

GANANITE
TARGETS: ASIA



NOTABLE ACTIVITY


January 2023
May 2023
Recon and infiltration of EU critical infrastructure orgs
CIS targeting with espionage and data theft

- On January 13, 2023, TR-2023-01 documented reconnaissance against and infiltrated various European critical infrastructure organizations. Along with credential capture via masqueraded domain phishing pages, the adversary utilizes an open-source Python RAT named Stink.
- In May of 2023, GANANITE continued targeting government and industrial organizations in the Commonwealth of Independent States with a focus on espionage and data theft, with the potential to hand off initial access to other threat groups.

LAURIONITE

LAURIONITE was first discovered actively targeting and exploiting Oracle E-Business Suite iSupplier web services and assets across several industries, including aviation, automotive, manufacturing, and government. Oracle E-Business Suite is one of the most widely used enterprise solutions for integrated business processes, including numerous industrial organizations such as United States Steel and Unifi textile manufacturing. This group utilizes a combination of open-source offensive security tooling and public proof of concepts to aid in their exploitation of common vulnerabilities.

By utilizing compromised infrastructure, **LAURIONITE** can remain undetected or overlooked due to its origin being from trusted or known organizations. Targeting companies that use Oracle's E-Suite iSupplier technology may not inherently impact OT assets but could allow adversaries like **LAURIONITE** to gain visibility into third-party vendor relationships, which can lead to follow-on intrusion operations. **LAURIONITE** has demonstrated the ability to conduct the complete attack cycle of offensive cyber operations that achieve Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain.

Lr

LAURIONITE TARGETS:
U.S., AUSTRALIA,
EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST



NOTABLE ACTIVITY



- **As early as March 5, 2023, LAURIONITE was observed targeting and exploiting Oracle E-Business Suite iSupplier web services.**

Other Active Threat Group Updates

KAMACITE – Active Since 2014

January: KAMACITE continued targeting Ukrainian telecommunications entities using the DarkCrystal remote access trojan (RAT) and then using native tools that exist within a victim's own networks. This activity continues a multi-year trend from KAMACITE conducting initial intrusion operations against Ukraine entities to reconnaissance operations against global industrial entities likely in pursuit of enabling follow-on intrusion operations from threat groups like ELECTRUM.

ELECTRUM – Active Since 2016

January: A variant of CADDYWIPER, used as part of the INDUSTROYER2 event, was identified in the wild. Dubbed SwiftSlicer, the destructive malware used Active Directory Group Policy to delete shadow copies and overwrites files before rebooting the computer.

MAGNALLIUM – Active Since 2013

July: MAGNALLIUM had seemingly disappeared for nearly a year until they began password-spraying operations against multiple defense and mining organizations. Prior MAGNALLIUM cyber operations have included initial access and reconnaissance actions before deploying destructive wiper malware on the victim's IT networks.

RASPITE – Active Since 2017

September: RASPITE conducted widespread campaigns scanning for vulnerable server message block (SMB) devices and using password-spraying techniques against various industry sectors, including defense and mining.

ELECTRUM – Active Since 2016

November: New information on the cyber attack in October 2022 revealed ELECTRUM leveraged a vulnerable device, running end-of-life (EOL) MicroSCADA software in the OT environment. ELECTRUM then attempted to impact the availability and control of a substation in Ukraine. A version of the destructive wiper malware CADDYWIPER was also used for lateral movement and to clean up their operational footprint from the compromised IT systems. In tandem with these events, significant kinetic attacks were taking place in the region.

2023 Ransomware Trends

Fifty ransomware groups were responsible for 905 reported ransomware incidents impacting industrial organizations this past year. This represents a 49.5 percent increase from 2022. Industrial organizations have much to lose because operational disruptions can carry significant financial and reputational costs. Further, there can be numerous cascading impacts on downstream businesses and outputs. The most common sector impacted in 2023 was manufacturing, with 71 percent of ransomware incidents. ICS equipment and engineering was the second most impacted sector, with 13 percent.

Ransomware operators' primary methods to gain initial access to victims' networks have remained steady in 2023, including collaborating with initial access brokers, phishing, and exploiting publicly accessible network assets, such as VPNs and RDP servers. Dragos also observed ransomware campaigns exploiting public-facing services and capitalizing on disclosed vulnerabilities.

638	Manufacturing
115	Industrial Control Systems
65	Transportation
30	Oil & Gas
20	Electric
13	Mining
10	Water, Renewables
2	Government, Defense



The most common sector impacted in 2023 was manufacturing, with 71 percent of ransomware incidents.
ICS equipment and engineering was the second most impacted sector, with 13 percent.

Figure 1: Ransomware Incidents by Sector • 2023



Figure 2: Ransomware by Manufacturing Subsector • 2023

2023 OT Vulnerability Trends

Many factors set OT apart from IT. Consider the type of devices, systems, and protocols used within these environments; the network architecture of typical OT networks; and the impact vulnerabilities can have on normal operations and the physical world. This is why OT vulnerabilities need to be mitigated and addressed according to strict operational requirements, where uptime is paramount, and considering the specific configuration and implementation of an asset. This is a challenge because many vulnerability advisories contain errors and lack actionable mitigations tailored to OT.

CVSS misapplication is the most common form of error encountered in vulnerability advisories. Dragos corrects CVSS scores and often directly contacts the vendors and researchers for clarification on how an adversary might exploit a given vulnerability in an OT environment.

Prioritizing vulnerabilities into actionable categories saves asset owners and operators from wasting time and resources on vulnerabilities with little or no impact on their operations. To prioritize the 2010 vulnerabilities to the signal of the ones you should care about, Dragos follows the Computer Emergency Response Coordination Center's (CERT/CC) **Now, Next, Never** methodology.

Vulnerabilities that fall into the **Now** category require immediate action and accounted for 3 percent of the vulnerabilities assessed in 2023. These vulnerabilities are generally network exploitable, have public proof of concept, and affect the loss of view or loss of control of operational technology processes. The **Now** category also include vulnerabilities under active exploitation by adversaries. Asset owners and operators should address these vulnerabilities as soon as practicable.

Neighborhood Keeper allows the community to gain anonymized visibility across various industrial environments. As a collective defense and community-wide visibility solution, Neighborhood Keeper enables a more informed industrial defense by sharing threat intelligence across industries and geographic regions. Dragos uses this data to help the community identify risk areas and how best to address them. Of the vulnerabilities reported through Neighborhood Keeper, 13 percent fall within the **Now** category, which requires immediate action.

Of the 2010 vulnerabilities in 2023, Dragos found that 3 percent required immediate action. A full 68 percent can be addressed by network monitoring, network segmentation, or MFA. And 29 percent require no immediate action but should be monitored for signs of possible exploitation.



From the OT Cybersecurity Frontlines

In 2023, we saw major regulatory shifts for critical infrastructure asset owners, resulting in organizations devoting more time and resources to preparing for a cybersecurity event. This included updates for U.S. pipeline operators in North America with TSA Pipeline-2021-02D (SD-02D). In Europe, it was the Network and Information Systems Directive (NIS2); in Australia, the Security of Critical Infrastructure SOCI Act; and the Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC) ECC in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

One of the most significant changes was not targeted at critical infrastructure but at firms publicly traded in the United States: the new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Cybersecurity Risk Management Rules. These rules apply to many OT asset owners, including investor-owned utilities and manufacturing firms. The SEC ruling requires registrants to disclose an event within four business days after a registrant determines that a cybersecurity incident is material. It also requires that organizations describe how they will assess, identify, and manage material risks from cybersecurity threats and how their boards will provide oversight.

Dragos worked with organizations growing their cybersecurity capabilities, defining or refining processes, and exercising plans. Organizations leading in this area are shifting from a reactive mindset that leverages break-glass retainers to a holistic approach for incident response that includes multiple levels within organizations supported by detection capabilities, training, and external experts.

In 2023, the quantity, type, and scope of tabletop exercises that Dragos facilitates changed. The number of exercises increased by 217 percent from 2022. The types and scope of the exercises shifted in 2023. Notably, this includes an increase of 350 percent in executive and board-level exercises.

Tabletop exercise findings and associated recommendations are organized by core capabilities for OT cybersecurity readiness and incident response. These are detect, communicate, activate, respond, contain, document, and recover. Core capabilities map to standard incident response processes regardless of whether the organization favors the four-step National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) process, SANS Preparation - Identification - Containment – Eradication - Recovery - Lessons Learned (PICERL), or some variation. Regardless of how the incident response plan is structured, these capabilities are needed to handle a cybersecurity event successfully.

Core Capability	2022 Score	2023 Score	Change	Metrics are as follows
Detect	73%	65%	-8	🟦 Performed without Challenges **80-100** 🟧 Performed with Some Challenges **66–79** 🟥 Performed with Major Challenges **50–65** ⬛ Unable to Perform **0–49**
Activate/Elevate	81%	67%	-14	
Respond	76%	62%	-14	
Contain	81%	64%	-17	
Communicate	76%	57%	-19	
Document	73%	65%	-8	
Remediate/Recover	81%	61%	-20	

Figure 4: Average Tabletop Exercise Scores (All OT)

Implementing 5 Critical Controls

As ICS/OT cybersecurity becomes a top priority, from boardrooms to the manufacturing floor, leaders and their teams must work together to implement programs and critical safeguards. A first step in implementing critical cybersecurity controls is achieving alignment on the key priorities. The SANS Institute identified five critical controls for ICS/OT cybersecurity.[1] We offer additional insight on how to implement these controls in your OT environments.

1 ICS incident response plan

OT's incident response plan (IRP) should be distinct from IT's. OT involves different device types, communication protocols, different types of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) specific to the industrial threat groups. Investigation requires a different set of tools and languages. Create a dedicated plan that includes the right points of contact, such as which employees have which skills inside which plant, and well thought-out next steps for specific scenarios at specific locations. An integral component of an IRP is establishing the collection criteria needed to respond to an incident prior to an incident. Consider table top simulation exercises to test and improve response plans.

2 A defensible architecture

OT security strategies often start with hardening the environment—removing extraneous OT network access points, maintaining strong policy control at IT/OT interface points, and mitigating high risk vulnerabilities. However, a defensible architecture is not simply a "hardened" one. It is one that supports the people and processes behind it. More specifically, it must support the collection requirements that were established in the IRP and implemented for improved OT visibility and monitoring.

3 Visibility and monitoring

A successful OT security posture maintains an inventory of assets, maps vulnerabilities against those assets (and mitigation plans), and actively monitors traffic for potential threats. Visibility gained from monitoring your industrial assets validates the security controls implemented in a defensible architecture. Threat detection from monitoring allows for scaling and automation for large and complex networks. Defenders should concentrate on the threat behaviors (or TTPs) identified in the IRP to avoid excess noise and focus on the risks they care about the most.

4 Secure remote access

Secure remote access is critical to OT environments. A key method, multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a rare case of a classic IT control that can be appropriately applied to OT. Implement MFA across your systems of systems to add an extra layer of security for a relatively small investment. Where MFA is not possible, consider alternate controls such as jumphosts with focused monitoring. The focus should be placed on connections in and out of the OT network and not on connections inside the network.

5 Risk-based vulnerability management

Knowing your vulnerabilities – and having a plan to manage them – is a critical component to a defensible architecture. Of the OT-specific vulnerabilities released last year, the majority of them had incomplete or erroneous information. An effective OT vulnerability management program requires timely awareness of key vulnerabilities, the small percentage that need immediate attention and apply to the environment, with correct information and risk ratings, as well as alternative mitigation strategies to minimize exposure while continuing to operate.

[1] https://www.sans.org/white-papers/five-ics-cybersecurity-critical-controls/

Download the 2023 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review Report

To get the complete analysis and review the full set of data from last year, download a copy of the Dragos 2023 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review Report. We offer a complete breakdown of our OT cyber threat intelligence findings, with frontline insights and actionable guidance that aligns to each finding.

DOWNLOAD REPORT

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Dragos is privately held and headquartered in the Washington, D.C. area with regional presence around the world, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and the Middle East.

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